Utah v. Rochell : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Utah v. Rochell : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Neeley; Campbell & Neeley; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rochell, No. 920309 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4240
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, : 
Defendant/Appellant,: 
Case No. 920309-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
(COCAINE) A THIRD DEGREE FELONY IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, 
PRESIDING. 
UTAH COK'Tr <"*F APPEALS 
UTAH 
5 • 
DOCKET NO. / / 
R. PAUL VAN DAM ( 3 3 1 2 ) 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant £-*L^ ~$ *jfr *fe Qsta&* 
OCT 3 01992 
r •* T Moonan 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920309-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
(COCAINE) A THIRD DEGREE FELONY IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 




THE OFFICER'S PROTECTIVE FRISK WAS SUPPORTED 
BY A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
ARMED AND DANGEROUS 11 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION BEYOND THE INITIAL 
PURPOSES OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED 
BY THE OFFICER'S REASONABLE SUSPICION OF 
OTHER MORE SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. . . , 15 
POINT III DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT 
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF HIS CONSENT TO 
SEARCH THE VEHICLE IN THE TRIAL COURT AND 
HAS THUS WAIVED ITS CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL; 
AS FOR DEFENDANT'S ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS 
OF TAINT, HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT 
EITHER THE DETENTION OR THE PROTECTIVE 
FRISK WERE ILLEGAL; THUS, NEITHER THE STATE 
NOR THIS COURT NEED ENGAGE IN A TAINT 
ANALYSIS 18 
A. Waiver of Consent Issue 18 
B. No Necessity for Taint Analysis 20 
POINT IV THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST 21 
CONCLUSION 23 
X 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
In re K.K.C.. 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) 21, 22, 23 
Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 13, 14 
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 7 
New York v. Bel ton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 22, 23 
Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) 19 
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1992) 2, 20 
State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App.) 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989) 1/11/ 12, 15, 20 
State v. Bradford. No. 910282-CA (Utah App. 
October 14, 1992) 11, 16 
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 20 
State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986) 13 
State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.) 
cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) 21, 22 
State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989) 13 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 2, 15, 18 
State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied. P.2d (Utah 1992) 2 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) 2, 19 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) 2, 18, 20 
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) 11, 12 
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) 12 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)) 4 
State v. Svkes, Case No. 910554-CA (Utah App. 
October 19, 1992) 2 
ii 
Stout v. State. 304 Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686 (Ark. 1991) . . . . 14 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 12, 14, 15 
United States v. Barnes. 909 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1990) 14 
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 19, 20 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (Supp. 1992) 3, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1992) 3, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992) 2, 3, 4, 22 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-106 (1992) 3 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-2 (1990) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1990) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992) 2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.4 (1987 
& Supp. 1992) 13, 14 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No, 920309-CA 
v. : 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), in 
the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the officer's protective frisk supported by a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous? 
This Court has implied that a deferential, clearly 
erroneous standard of review applies to a trial court's 
determination of reasonable suspicion in support of a protective 
frisk. State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.) ("the 
record contains sufficient evidence that the officers in this 
case were justified in frisking defendant") (emphasis added), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). Because a protective 
frisk must be based on reasonable suspicion that a person is 
armed, it is appropriate to apply a clearly erroneous standard, 
the general standard for reasonable suspicion rulings. See State 
v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181f 183 (Utah 198?) (trial court 
determination of reasonable suspicion will not be reversed on 
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous); State v. Svkes, Case No. 
910554-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. October 19, 1992) (trial 
court determination of reasonable suspicion should not be 
overturned unless it is clearly erroneous). But see State v. 
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App.) (applying nondeferential, 
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's 
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied, P.2d 
(Utah 1992). 
2. Was defendant's detention beyond the initial 
purposes of the traffic stop supported by a reasonable suspicion 
of other more serious criminal activity? 
A trial court's ruling on this question is also 
reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous. State v. Robinson. 
797 P.2d 431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Was defendant's consent to search his vehicle 
sufficiently attenuated from the alleged improper protective 
frisk and detention? Additionally, notwithstanding defendant's 
consent, was contraband seized from his vehicle tainted by the 
alleged improper protective frisk and detention? 
Defendant failed to preserve for review any argument 
concerning the validity of his consent to search the vehicle. 
2 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992). As for his 
allegations of taint resulting from the protective frisk and 
detention, the standard of review for a trial court's reasonable 
suspicion determination — stated above — applies here also. 
4. Was the vehicle search justified as incident to 
defendant's arrest? 
Because defendant does not challenge the validity of 
his arrest, or the trial court's conclusion that the vehicle 
search was justified as incident to his arrest, no standard of 
review for this issue need be set forth. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992); possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) without tax stamps affixed, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1992); 
speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-46(2)(d) (Supp. 1992); open container of liquor in or about 
a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 41-6-44.20 (Supp. 1992) (R. 10-12). 
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Defendant filed a motion to suppress contraband 
allegedly seized in violation of the fourth amendment and article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 17). 
After conducting a suppression hearing, the trial court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 38, 40-49). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
reduced offense of possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), which preserved defendant's 
right to appeal the suppression ruling (see State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah App. 1988)) (R. 50-54). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees 
(R. 66). The court then stayed defendant's sentence and placed 
him on three years probation under certain specified conditions 
(R. 66-67). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following pertinent evidence was presented at the 
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. It supports the trial 
court's findings.l 
On the evening of June 5, 1991, Trooper Maycock of the 
Utah Highway Patrol stopped defendant's vehicle on the northbound 
1
 Although the trial court's written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are contained in the record before this Court, 
they have not been numbered. A copy of the court's ruling is 
contained in Addendum B and the State will hereafter cite this 
Court to Addendum B when referring to the trial court's written 
findings and conclusions. 
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lane of 1-15, near north Salt Lake, for speeding (Transcript of 
suppression hearing, March 18, 1992 [T.] at 3). Immediately upon 
being stopped, defendant exited his vehicle and began walking 
toward Trooper Maycock (T. 4). Defendant's passenger remained 
seated inside the car. Although he had anticipated a routine 
traffic stop, Trooper Maycock was "alerted" by defendant's 
behavior because it was unusual for a stopped driver to approach 
his patrol car (T. 12). The officer proceeded to carry out the 
traffic stop, making sure he could see defendant's hands (T. 12). 
Trooper Maycock asked defendant for his driver's 
license, and in so doing, noticed the smell of alcohol on 
defendant's breath (T. 4). Defendant produced a valid Utah 
drivers' license, and the officer asked how much he had had to 
drink (T. 4). Defendant replied, "One beer" (T. 4). Trooper 
Maycock then asked defendant to perform a horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test to determine whether he was unlawfully intoxicated 
(T. 4). After defendant successfully completed the test, Trooper 
Maycock informed him that he had been stopped for a speeding 
violation (T. 5, 15). 
The officer then asked to see defendant's vehicle 
registration (T. 5, 15). Defendant returned to his vehicle to 
retrieve the registration, followed by Trooper Maycock who was 
concerned that defendant might have a weapon in the vehicle (T. 
17). When defendant opened the passenger side door to access the 
glove compartment, a plastic cup fell out, spilling alcohol on 
the ground (T. 5). The officer picked up the cup, checked the 
5 
smell, and returned it to defendant's passenger, who identified 
himself as Billy Gene Miller (T. 5). 
Trooper Maycock then asked defendant to sit in his 
(defendant's) vehicle while he returned to the patrol car to 
write out citations (T. 6). The officer cited defendant for the 
speeding and seat belt violations and Miller for the open 
container violation. He then returned to defendant's vehicle and 
asked both defendant and Miller to step to the front of the car 
where he advised them that only Miller had been cited for the 
open container violation (T. 7). However, based on his 
observation of the open container, and the smell of alcohol on 
both men, Trooper Maycock indicated that he wanted to search the 
driver's side area of defendant's vehicle for additional 
containers, and that if he found one, he would cite defendant for 
that violation as well (T. 7, 25). 
Because searching the vehicle would necessitate having 
his back to both men, Trooper Maycock first inquired whether 
either defendant or Miller had any weapons (T. 7, 23, 29). Both 
men said "No," and Miller immediately began emptying his pockets 
(T. 7). However, Trooper Maycock noticed a large bulge inside 
the left front pocket of defendant's shorts (T. 8). Fearing that 
the bulge was some type of a pocket knife, the officer lightly 
tapped it, determined that it was hard, and asked "What do you 
have in your pocket?" (T. 8). Defendant replied that he didn't 
have a weapon and produced a set of keys (T. 8)* 
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Because there was still a noticeable bulge in 
defendant's pocket, the officer lightly tapped it again, noted 
that it was still hard, and asked, "What's that?" (T. 8). 
Trooper Maycock then explained that he didn't like the "thought 
of getting stuck with a pen knife" (T. 9). Defendant reached 
into his pocket a second time and produced a handful of loose 
change (T. 9). In so doing, he exposed a plastic baggie 
containing a white powdery substance (T. 9). The officer asked, 
"What's that baggy [sic]" and defendant replied, "Nothing" (T. 
9). Defendant then attempted to conceal the baggie behind his 
back (T. 9). 
Another officer, who had just arrived on the scene, 
approached from behind defendant.2 After observing defendant's 
attempts to conceal the baggie behind his back, Officer Garrido 
seized the contraband (T. 10). Defendant was immediately 
arrested for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (T. 
10). Following the administration of Miranda warnings,3 the 
officers inquired whether there was "any other dope in the car" 
(T. 10). Defendant said "Yes," and "advised" the officers "where 
it could be found" (T. 10). The officers then retrieved 
additional contraband from "between the cushions of the passenger 
seat" (T. 10). 
2
 Trooper Maycock was contacted by Officer Garrido while 
sitting in his patrol vehicle writing out the initial citations. 
Officer Garrido requested Trooper Maycock's location so that he 
could return some handcuffs he had borrowed to make an earlier 
arrest (T. 6). 
3
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Defendant filed a motion to suppress the contraband 
seized on the ground that it had been obtained in violation of 
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution (R. 17). In a supporting memorandum defendant 
alleged that Trooper Maycock lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk 
him for weapons and that additional contraband discovered in his 
vehicle was "fruit discovered from the previous illegal search of 
defendant's person and should be excluded" (R. 18-28) (copies of 
defendant's motion and memorandum are contained in Addendum A). 
At a hearing on the matter, defendant argued that 
Trooper Maycock lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him because 
"there was nothing to alert the officer that [he and Miller] had 
any weapons on them" (T. 39). Additionally, defendant argued 
that the officer "exceeded the duration and the scope of his 
initial stop when he ordered [defendant and Miller] to step 
forward so he [could] search them and search the vehicle" (T. 
41). Finally, defendant argued that the vehicle search was not 
supported by probable cause (T. 41) (a complete copy of defense 
counsel's argument is contained in Addendum A). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion on the 
grounds that the protective frisk and detention were reasonable 
and that the search of the vehicle was supported by probable 
cause. Additionally, the court concluded that the seizure of 
contraband from defendant's vehicle was justified as incident to 
his arrest (Addendum B). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's determination of reasonableness with 
respect to the protective frisk and the scope of the detention is 
not clearly erroneous. Concerning the officer's protective 
frisk, the officer's observation of a noticeable bulge in 
defendant's pocket reasonably gave rise to his suspicion that 
defendant was armed and potentially dangerous. The 
reasonableness of the officer's fear is not overcome by the fact 
that defendant and his passenger were outside the vehicle at the 
time of the frisk; moreover, as recently recognized by this 
Court, roadside traffic stops are inherently dangerous. 
Additionally, the protective frisk was no more intrusive than 
necessary to dispel or confirm the officer's suspicion of a 
concealed weapon. 
As for the scope of the detention beyond the initial 
purposes of the traffic stop, the officer had at least a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant and his passenger were 
involved in other more serious criminal activity. During the 
course of investigating defendant's driver's license the officer 
smelled alcohol on the breath of both men and defendant admitted 
to having had one beer. Additionally, the officer observed an 
open container of alcohol fall from the passenger compartment 
when defendant attempted to retrieve the vehicle registration. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, further detention 
was justified to investigate for consumption of alcohol while 
driving. 
9 
The trial court's conclusion that the subsequent search 
of defendant's vehicle was justified as incident to his arrest 
was similarly proper and should be affirmed. Defendant was 
arrested following the protective frisk which revealed the 
presence of contraband on his person. Contemporaneous with his 
arrest for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), 
defendant's vehicle was searched for additional contraband. 
Because the contraband found on defendant's person provided 
probable cause for his arrest independent of the contraband later 
seized from his vehicle and because defendant's vehicle was 
within his immediate control at the time of his arrest, the 
contraband found therein was admissible. 
Finally, because the vehicle search was justified as 
incident to defendant's arrest, there is no need to consider 
whether the search would be justified under the "automobile 
exception," or any other exception to the warrant requirement. 
Although defendant challenges the vehicle search on the ground 
that his consent was not sufficiently attenuated from alleged 
prior illegalities, he failed to preserve any argument concerning 
his consent in the trial court and has thus waived its 
consideration on appeal. As for defendant's additional 
allegations of taint stemming from the protective frisk and the 
scope of detention, he has failed to demonstrate that either the 
protective frisk or the detention were improper. Thus, it is not 





THE OFFICER'S PROTECTIVE FRISK WAS SUPPORTED 
BY A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
ARMED AND DANGEROUS 
In Point I of his brief defendant asserts that because 
Trooper Maycock "did not initially frisk [him] upon confronting 
him," nor during the course of administering a subsequent field 
sobriety test, the officer could not have reasonably suspected 
that he was "armed and dangerous" (Br. of Appellant [App.] at 
15). As support for his assertion defendant argues that "some 15 
to 25 minutes after the initial stop, neither [he] nor his 
passenger had done anything to suggest they were armed and 
dangerous" (Br. of App. at 15). Because defendant's argument 
ignores the trial court's factual findings that the "officer 
noticed a bulge in defendant's left front pocket" (Addendum B), 
and that the officer reasonably "believed [the bulge to be] a 
knife or other weapon" (Addendum B), his argument lacks merit and 
should be rejected. 
It is permissible for an officer "who reasonably 
suspects that an individual may be armed and dangerous, to pat 
down the outer clothing of that individual in a search for 
concealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault." 
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.) (quotation 
omitted), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). See also State 
v. Bradford, No. 910282-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. October 14, 
1992); State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986); Utah Code 
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Ann. § 77-7-16 (1990)/ The reasonableness of a protective 
frisk is assessed under an objective standard: "[W]ould the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 
(1968) (quotation and citations omitted). See also Avala, 762 
P.2d at 1111 ("The standard is whether a reasonably prudent man 
under the circumstances would believe that his safety or that of 
others was in jeopardy"). Thus, it is not "essential" that the 
officer actually be in fear, or that he be absolutely certain 
that the suspect is armed. Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 293. 
Trooper Maycock's protective frisk was based on a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. 
Determining that he should search the driver's side area of the 
vehicle for an additional open container,5 Trooper Maycock asked 
defendant and Miller to step away from the vehicle (T. 6). See 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (driver 
stopped for traffic violation may be ordered out of vehicle for 
purposes of officer safety); Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 293-94 
(recognizing "need of officers to take reasonable precautions to 
insure their safety"). After defendant and Miller exited the 
A
 Section 77-7-16 provides: 
A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the 
person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably 
believes he or any other person is in danger. 
5
 Defendant's allegations concerning the propriety of the 
vehicle search are addressed in Point IV of this brief. 
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vehicle, Trooper Maycock observed a "bulge" in the left front 
pocket of defendant's shorts, the dimensions of which reasonably 
led the officer to believe that defendant was concealing a type 
of pocket knife and that he should perform a protective frisk 
before searching the vehicle (T. 8). 
As recently noted by this Court,"roadside traffic stops 
are particularly dangerous when weapons may be present in the 
area immediately surrounding a suspect." Bradford, No. 910282-
CA, slip op. at 4. See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1047-49 n.13 (1983) ("investigative detentions involving suspects 
in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police 
officers," approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an 
officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle); State v. 
Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (officer shot without 
warning as he approached vehicle); 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 9.4(a) n.26 (1987) (noting that more officers are shot 
while conducting field interrogations than while dealing with 
known felons and that 43% of officer shootings that occur 
pursuant to a vehicle stop, take place after the initial contact 
has been made). In Bradford. this Court further noted that "an 
officer's reasonable fear" is "not overcome" by the "the fact, 
taken in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an 
officer is conducting a search." Id. at 5. See State v. Dorsev, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1093 n.3 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J.f concurring) 
(rejecting defendant's contention that it was "unrealistic" for 
officers to fear that defendants presented a threat to their 
13 
safety since they were "standing by the rear of the truck under 
control of several officers holding drawn weapons"). See also 
Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 (rejecting a similar claim, reasoning that 
a suspect "despite being under the brief control of a police 
officer, [could] reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon"). 
Additionally, the noticeable bulge in defendant's 
pocket reasonably supported Trooper Maycock's belief that 
defendant had access to a concealed weapon. Stout v. State, 304 
Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ark. 1991) (protective frisk 
justified in order to determine that "obvious bulge" in suspect's 
jacket was not a weapon); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 
1067 n.10 (7th Cir. 1990) (protective frisk justified by 
officer's observation of a "heavy object" protruding from 
suspect's jacket pocket). See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 
9.4(a) n.44-45 (1987 & Supp. 1992). Moreover, the officer's 
protective frisk was not overly intrusive, consisting of light 
taps on the outside of defendant's pocket. Terxy, 392 U.S. at 6, 
30 (upholding more aggressive frisk where the officer "grabbed 
petitioner Terry, spun him around . . . and patted down the 
outside of his clothing," on the ground that the frisk did not 
invade Terry's person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes 
and was thus confined to what was minimally necessary to discover 
the suspected weapon). 
In light of the foregoing, defendant's unsupported 
assertions fail to demonstrate that the trial court's 
determination of reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk was 
14 
clearly erroneous. Avala, 762 P.2d at 1111; Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987). Based on his observations of the 
suspicious bulge in defendant's pocket, Trooper Maycock's 
protective frisk was reasonable. Additionally, his light taps on 
the outside of defendant's pocket were no more intrusive than 
necessary to confirm or dispel his suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 
19 n.15. Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
determination that the officer's protective frisk was reasonable 
and proper under the fourth amendment. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION BEYOND THE INITIAL 
PURPOSES OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY 
THE OFFICER'S REASONABLE SUSPICION OF OTHER 
MORE SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
In Point II of his brief defendant asserts that 
"Trooper Maycock's detention of [him] exceeded the scope of the 
traffic stop and was not justified by a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity" (Br. of App. at 15). Additionally, defendant 
asserts that "Trooper Maycock had no reason to search [him]," or 
his vehicle (Br. of App. at 17). As defendant's allegations 
concerning the reasonableness of the protective frisk are 
addressed in Point I of this brief, and his allegations 
concerning the propriety of the vehicle search will be addressed 
in Point IV of this brief, the State's response here will focus 
on the reasonableness of the detention. Defendant's arguments 
concerning the scope of his detention lack merit and should be 
rejected. 
As recently observed by this Court, "[a]fter stopping a 
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vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer may briefly detain 
the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle 
registration and the driver's license." State v. Bradford, No. 
910282-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. October 14, 1992) (quotations 
and citations omitted). However, once the driver has produced a 
valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, the 
occupants may not be further detained in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion of other serious criminal activity. JEd. at 
3-4. 
Defendant acknowledges that the stop of his vehicle for 
a traffic violation was justified at its inception (Br. of App. 
at 16). Specifically, Trooper Maycock stopped defendant's car 
for traveling sixty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-
hour zone (T. 3), a clear violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
46(2)(d) (Supp. 1992). See Bradford, No. 910282-CA, slip op. at 
3 (police officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has 
witnessed the commission of a traffic violation). Defendant's 
detention beyond the initial purposes of the traffic stop was 
similarly justified based on observations by th€* officer during 
that time which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
defendant's participation in other more serious criminal 
activity. JEd. at 4. 
During the course of his investigation Trooper Maycock 
smelled alcohol on both defendant's and Miller's breath, and 
defendant admitted that he had been drinking (T. 4, 6). 
Additionally, the officer observed an open container of alcohol 
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fall from the passenger side of the vehicle when defendant 
attempted to retrieve the vehicle registration from the glove 
compartment (T. 5). At the very least, these circumstances gave 
rise to a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use such that further 
detention to investigate for consumption of alcohol while driving 
was justified. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20(1) & (2) (Supp. 
1992) (prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverage or 
possession of an open container while in a motor vehicle on a 
highway). Considering the totality of the circumstances, it is 
hard to imagine what more an officer would need beyond the 
circumstances present here: the smell of alcohol on both 
defendant and his passenger, an open container of alcohol in the 
passenger compartment, and defendant's admission that he had been 
drinking. See Bradford,. No. 910282-CA, slip op. at 5 (courts 
will engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis to 
determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of 
criminality). 
Although not directly so stating, the trial court 
implicitly determined that the scope of defendant's detention was 
supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct 
(Addendum B).6 Because defendant's unsupported assertions fail 
to demonstrate that the trial court's determination was clearly 
erroneous, this Court should affirm. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
* In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial 
court concluded that Trooper Maycock "had probable cause to believe 
that another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle" (Addendum B) 
(emphasis added). 
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431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 
183 (Utah 1987). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT 
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF HIS CONSENT TO 
SEARCH THE VEHICLE IN THE TRIAL COURT AND HAS 
THUS WAIVED ITS CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL; AS 
FOR DEFENDANT'S ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF 
TAINT, HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT EITHER 
THE DETENTION OR THE PROTECTIVE FRISK WERE 
ILLEGAL; THUS, NEITHER THE STATE NOR THIS 
COURT NEED ENGAGE IN A TAINT ANALYSIS 
In Point III of his brief defendant asserts that 
contraband discovered inside in his vehicle was illegally seized 
(Br. of App. at 18). In so arguing, defendant primarily asserts 
that his consent to search the vehicle was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the officer's previous "illegal seizure of the 
controlled substances from his front pocket" (Br. of App. at 18). 
Additionally, defendant asserts that contraband found in his 
vehicle "was discovered as a result of exploitation of the 
illegal detention and search of [his] person" (Br. of App. at 
18). Because defendant failed to preserve any argument 
concerning the validity of his consent to search the vehicle in 
the trial court and because he has not demonstrated that the 
detention or the protective frisk were illegal, this Court should 
reject both arguments. 
A. Waiver of Consent Issue 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical 
evidence against him in the trial court, broadly alleging that 
the contraband had been illegally seized under the fourth 
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amendment and article I, section 14 of the state constitution (R. 
17; see Addendum A). In his supporting memorandum defendant 
cursorily relied on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)f to allege 
that contraband "found in [his] vehicle [was] fruit discovered 
from the previous illegal search of [his] person and should be 
excluded" (R. 18-28, 26; see Addendum A). He made no argument 
challenging the validity of the alleged consent search of the 
vehicle (R. 18-28, see Addendum A). 
Defendant's oral argument on the matter was similarly 
devoid of any meaningful analysis concerning his argument under 
Wong Sun and Sibron. Rather, defendant merely concluded that 
"the second baggy [sic] obviously came from exploitation of . . . 
an illegal search and seizure which led to its finding after the 
wrongful taking of the first one" (T. 42; see Addendum A). 
Additionally, like his memorandum, defendant's oral argument was 
bereft of any challenge to the validity of his consent to search 
the vehicle (T. 38-42, see Addendum A). 
On appeal to this Court defendant asserts for the first 
time that contraband discovered inside his vehicle was illegally 
seized because his consent to search the vehicle was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the officer's "illegal detention and 
search of [his] person" (Br. of App. at 18). Defendant's 
complete failure to develop this argument in the trial court 
constitutes a waiver of its consideration on appeal. State v. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
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Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). The fourth amendment law 
recited in defendant's brief was available for presentation in 
the trial court; moreover, the record fails to indicate any 
reason for defendant's failure to develop the argument below. 
Absent special justification for failing to present all available 
grounds in support of a suppression motion, this Court will not 
rule on those grounds not addressed in the trial court. Ibid. 
B. No Necessity for Taint Analysis 
As for defendant's secondary assertion that the 
contraband seized from his vehicle was discovered as a result of 
the officer's "exploitation of the illegal detention and 
[frisk]," for reasons set forth in Points I-II of this brief, 
defendant has not demonstrated that either the protective frisk, 
or the scope of the detention were illegal. Thus, it is not 
necessary for the State, or this Court, to engage in an analysis 
of defendant's allegations of taint under Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
487 (excluding evidence come at by exploitation of illegality 
rather than by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint). Because defendant's unsupported assertions 
of illegality and taint under Wong Sun fail to pinpoint any clear 
error in the trial court's factual findings concerning reasonable 
suspicion for the protective frisk and detention, this Court 
should affirm. State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990). 
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POINT IV 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST 
In Point IV of his brief defendant again challenges the 
reasonableness of the protective frisk and the detention (Br, of 
App. at 19). Additionallyf defendant asserts that Trooper 
Maycock did not have probable cause to search his vehicle (Br. of 
App. at 19). As defendant's allegations concerning the 
reasonableness of the protective frisk and the scope of detention 
are addressed in Points I-II of this brief, the State's response 
here will focus on the propriety of the vehicle search. 
Defendant's argument concerning the validity of the vehicle 
search lacks merit and should be rejected. 
An exception to the probable cause and warrant 
requirements of the fourth amendment "justifies warrantless 
searches and seizures incident to a lawful arrest." In re 
K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1981); State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.) ("contemporaneous, warrantless search 
of the area within an arrestee's immediate control is permissible 
for the purpose of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, 
or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence"), cert, 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). As defendant has raised no 
challenge to the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest for 
possession of a controlled substance,7 the only issue on appeal 
7
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1990) (peace officer may 
make a warrantless arrest for any public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence). 
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is whether the seizure of contraband from defendant's vehicle was 
made incident to his arrest. 
The trial court did not make an express finding as to 
the time of defendant's arrest; however, Trooper Maycock 
testified at the suppression hearing that defendant was arrested 
immediately following the protective frisk revealing the presence 
of contraband on defendant's person (T. 10). Following the 
administration of Miranda warnings, the officer inquired whether 
defendant had "any other dope in the car" (T. 10). Defendant 
said "Yes," and "advised" Trooper Maycock "where it could be 
found" (T. 10). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that 
"[t]he seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was pursuant to a 
valid arrest" (Addendum B). 
Based on the foregoing, the search of defendant's 
vehicle was permissible as incident to his arrest. K.K.C., 636 
P.2d at 1046. The cocaine found on defendant's person provided 
probable cause for his arrest independent of the contraband later 
seized from the vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) & (2) 
(Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the knowing and intentional possession 
and/or distribution of controlled substances). Moreover, 
defendant and Miller were standing near the vehicle at the time 
of the arrest and search (T. 9-10). The car being "within 
[defendant's] immediate control," New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 460 (1981), the contraband found as a result of the vehicle 
search was admissible. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 784 n.29 (and 
cases cited therein recognizing constitutional validity of 
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searches incident to arrest where the arrestees were similarly 
removed from the searched area).8 Thus, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the search was justified as incident to 
defendant's arrest and this Court should affirm that conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence should be affirmed. Defendant's conviction 
therefore should also be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30^day of October, 1992. 
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 Because the vehicle search was justified as incident to 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
14 of the State of Utah Constitution. Upon suppression of the 
above described evidence, the criminal charges against defendant 
should be dismissed. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
DISMISS 
Judge: D»~s/er L. £<>*>.*£-, 
Civil No. 921700013FS 
Comes now defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, and submits the 
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his 
Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss, as follows, to-wit: 
FACTS 
1. On June 5, 1991, Trooper Dave Maycock, was stationary 
at the St. Joes overpass on 1-15. His patrol vehicle was facing 
south and he was running radar. 
2. At approximately 2015 hours, he observed a yellow 
Mustang northbound in the left lane. He estimated its speed at 65 
M.P.H. He watched his radar unit, which showed a reading of 66 
M.P.H., then it dropped to 65 M.P.H. The speed limit in that area 
is 55 M.P.H. 
3. Traffic was light to moderate and the weather was 
clear. He pursued the vehicle, caught up to it, and initiated a 
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traffic stop just north of the right hand guard rail near Carpenter 
Paper, Davis County, Utah. 
4. The driver exited the vehicle and met him between 
their cars. He immediately noticed the smell of alcohol coming 
from defendant Rochell's breath. He asked to see defendants 
driver license, at which time he offered it to Trooper Maycock. 
The driver was identified by his picture driver license as Jeffrey 
W. Rochell, D.O.B. 3-16-70. 
5. The Trooper asked defendant Rochell how much he had 
to drink, and defendant stated "one beer". The Trooper had 
defendant perform a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test and got no clues 
as to his being intoxicated. The Trooper then advised defendant of 
the reason for his stopping him and asked to see his registration. 
6. Defendant Rochell approached the passenger side of 
the vehicle and opened the door. As soon as he opened the door a 
blue plastic cup with alcoholic beverage in it fell out and spilled 
on the ground. The Trooper then asked the passenger for some I.D., 
the passenger stated he had none. The passenger identified himself 
as Billy Gene Miller, D.O.B. 1-30-50. 
7. Defendant Miller also had an obvious odor of alcohol 
coming from his breath. Defendant Rochell found the vehicle 
registration and joined the Trooper again at the rear of his 
vehicle. 
8. The Trooper advised defendant Rochell to return to 
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his vehicle. The Trooper returned to his patrol vehicle. The 
Trooper filled out a citation for defendant Rochell for speeding 
65/55, and failure to wear his seatbelt. The Trooper also filled 
out a citation for defendant Miller for an open container. 
9. Officer Garrido of North Salt Lake P.D. called the 
Trooper on the radio and asked if he could meet Trooper Maycock. 
Trooper Maycock told him his location and asked Officer Garrido to 
meet the Trooper there. Officer Garrido had to return a set of 
Trooper Maycock's handcuffs he had borrowed earlier on a previous 
arrest. 
10. Trooper Maycock approached the driver side of the 
vehicle again and asked both occupants to step to the front of 
their vehicle. The Trooper advised them he had already seen the 
one open container of alcohol and defendant Miller was receiving a 
citation for it. The Trooper advised them that he was going to 
have a look into the car to see if there was another open 
container, and that defendant Rochell would be cited for it if 
there was. 
11. About that time, Officer Garrido pulled in behind 
the Trooper's patrol vehicle. Trooper Maycock was facing south so 
he could see Officer Garrido's approach and both suspects was 
facing north with their backs to the vehicles. 
12. The Trooper asked both defendants if they had any 
weapons, knives or needles on them that he could be stuck with 
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while he was bent over looking into the car. Both stated "no". 
Defendant Miller volunteered everything in his pockets without 
being asked. He had no weapons. 
13. Defendant Rochell just stated something to the 
effect of no, he didn't have any weapons on him. The Trooper saw 
a bulge in his left front pocket and he tapped it with the back of 
his fingers, feeling that it was something hard. Trooper Maycock 
asked "what's that"? Defendant Rochell reached in his pocket, 
rustled around for a second and then pulled out a set of keys. The 
Trooper noticed there was still a bulge there and tapped it again 
with the back of his fingers, feeling only that something was hard 
in there. The Trooper asked again "what's that"? and added "I 
don't like those little pen knives." Defendant Rochell stated it 
was only change. The Trooper asked him to pull it out so he could 
see. Defendant Rochell put his hand into his pocket again, rustled 
around for a second and pulled out a handful of change. 
14. As defendant Rochell pulled out his change he also 
partially exposed a plastic baggie. The Trooper pointed to the 
baggie/pocket and asked "what's that"? Defendant Rochell put his 
hand into his pocket with change still in his hand and stated 
"nothing" pulling his hand back out of his pocket and concealing it 
behind his back. Officer Garrido immediately went for Mr. 
Rochell's hand and pulled the baggie from his hand. 
15. Officer Garrido immediately handed the baggie to 
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Trooper Maycock. In it was a powdery substance suspected to be 
cocaine. 
16. Both individuals were placed into custody and given 
Miranda. Defendant Rochell received his rights by Trooper Maycock 
and defendant Miller received his rights by Officer Garrido. 
17. Defendant Miller denied any knowledge of any 
narcotics in the vehicle. 
18. Defendant Rochell was asked by Trooper Maycock and 
again by Officer Garrido if there was any other "Dope" in the car. 
Defendant Rochell stated that there was another baggie just like 
the one the Trooper found in his pocket, stuck between the cushions 
of the passenger sear. As was stated by him, another baggie was 
found in that position. 
19. Defendant Rochelle indicated to Detective Lon Bryan 
the second baggie of cocaine found between the cushions of the 
passenger sear was the property of Billy G. Miler. 
I 
THE TROOPER MAY INITIALLY ENGAGE IN A 
PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT ROCHELLE 
IF HE REASONABLY BELIEVES HE IS IN DANGER. 
Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in 
a car than in his or her home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 
390-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed. 2d 406 (1085), one does 
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not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an 
automobile. However, when an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic 
violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants 
while he examines the vehicle registration and the driver's 
license. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
1396, 59 L.Ed 2d 660 (1979). An officer, for his own protection, 
may also order a driver out of a vehicle which has been stopped for 
a traffic violation. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 
330, 54 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1977). 
U.C.A., 1953, Section 77-7-16, authorizes a peace officer 
to frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes 
he or any other person is in danger. The section must be 
interpreted to meet the constitutional requirements of Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In that 
case, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to 
the requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. The 
exception applies in cases where the officer has a reasonable 
belief, based on "specific and articulable facts," that the person 
may be armed and dangerous. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. State v. 
Carter, Utah 707 P.2d 656 (1985). 
Although a warrant is required before the government may 
intrude upon a person's reasonably expectation of privacy, an 
exception to the warrant requirement is the investigative stop 
situation. The United States Supreme Court has held that a law 
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enforcement officer may "in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating 
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause 
to make an arrest." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1880, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 889 (1968). The oft-stated test to determine 
the validity of a temporary investigative stop, short of an arrest 
based on probable cause, is whether the police officer can point to 
specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. 
Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 
II 
THE FACT THAT TROOPER MAYCOCK DID NOT 
CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO INITIALLY 
FRISK DEFENDANT ROCHELLE PRECLUDES 
CONCLUSION THAT TROOPER HAD A REASON-
ABLE BASIS TO SUSPECT DEFENDANT ROCHELLE 
MIGHT BE ARMED AND DANGEROUS PERMITTING 
SEARCH OF HIS PERSON BEFORE SEARCHING 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
It is obvious from the facts of this case Trooper Maycock 
had no reasonable basis or suspicion he may articulate that 
defendant Rochelle was armed and dangerous justifying a search of 
his person. Trooper Maycock did not consider defendant armed and 
dangerous as evidenced by the following: 
1. Defendant upon being stopped by the Trooper did not 
flee or attempt to evade the Trooper. 
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2. Defendant exited his vehicle and met him between 
their vehicles. 
3. Defendant produced his driver's license. 
4. Defendant cooperated in performing field sobriety 
tests requested by the Trooper. 
5. The Trooper was standing extremely close to defendant 
in order to conduct Horizontal Gaze Nystagas Test. 
6. The Trooper did not initially frisk the defendant 
evidencing no fear or suspicion defendant was armed and dangerous. 
7. Defendant went to his vehicle with Trooper to obtain 
his automobile registration. 
8. Trooper allowed defendant to get into his vehicle to 
obtain registration evidencing Trooper had no fear or suspicion 
that defendant might obtain a weapon while searching for 
registration. 
9. Defendant cooperated and produced his vehicle 
registration. 
10. Defendant joined the Trooper at the rear of his 
vehicle with the registration. 
11. Trooper decides to issue citations for offenses and 
allows defendant to return to his vehicle evidencing no fear that 
defendant might obtain a weapon from the vehicle. 
12. Defendant exits vehicle and steps to front of 
vehicle when requested by Trooper to receive citation. 
3 
MEMORANDUM 
STATE VS. ROCHELL 
Case No. 921700013FS 
Page 9 
13. Trooper then indicates for the first time he is 
going to search the parties for weapons before searching their 
vehicle for alcohol. He was not searching the vehicle for weapons. 
14. Both defendants indicated they had no weapons on 
their person. Trooper searches defendant Miller and finds no 
weapon. 
15. Trooper persists in searching defendant Rochelle 
until defendant empties his front pocket. 
From the facts and sequence of events in the case, it is 
clear the Trooper had no fear the defendant had a weapon on his 
person or one in the vehicle as he allowed defendant to get back 
into his vehicle unattended. Therefore, the frisk of defendant 
Rochelle prior to searching the vehicle was not for dangerous 
weapons based upon a reasonable belief or suspicion and therefore 
not permitted by Terry v. Ohio or 77-7-16 U.C.A., as amended. The 
baggie of cocaine seized from defendant's person should be 
suppressed. 
Ill 
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S MOTOR 
VEHICLE WAS A DIRECT RESULT FROM EVIDENCE 
WRONGFULLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT AND IS 
FRUIT OF PREVIOUS ILLEGAL SEARCH. 
The second baggie of cocaine seized from defendant's 
motor vehicle was discovered as a direct result of evidence 
wrongfully seized from defendant. The second baggie of cocaine 
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found in the vehicle is fruit discovered from the previous illegal 
search of defendant's person and should be excluded. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963); 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed. 2d 917 
(1968). 
Further, defendant Rochell indicated to the officers on 
the scene the second baggie of cocaine was not his but that of 
defendant Miller who put it between the cushions of his seat. 
CONCLUSION 
The search of defendant's Rochelle person by Trooper 
Maycock was illegal contrary to the United States and Utah 
Constitution and the evidence produced there from should be 
suppressed. The fruits derived from the illegal search should 
likewise be suppressed and all evidence derived as a result thereof 
suppressed from evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this 2JLL1 day of February, 
NROBERTL7NEEi^Y J 
Attorney for Defendant Roche/le 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Suppress and Dismiss to plaintiff's attorney, William K. 
/ 
McGuire, Davis County Deputy Attorney, this J?y day of February, 
1992. 
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1 before the Court, that this evidence should not be 
2 suppressed. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Neeley? 
4 MR. NEELEY: In response, your Honor, I would like to 
5 point out some language to you. I suspect the Court's 
6 already familiar with it and has the memorandums on file. 
7 But my understanding of the Terry v. Ohio case as well as 
8 Section 77-6-16 of the Utah Code authorizes a police officer 
9 to search a party he's confronting if he reasonably believes 
10 he is endangered. 
11 And the Court has set forth something that has been 
12 described as a narrowly drawn exception to the requirement 
13 that police always obtain a warrant before any searches. 
14 Searches per say are unreasonable unless they fall within the 
15 exception. And the exception set forth in Terry applies in a 
16 case where the officer has reasonable belief based upon facts 
17 that he can articulate and be specific about that this person 
18 must be armed and dangerous. 
19 I emphasize this, your Honor, because it's apparent 
20 that Trooper Haycock has been in the.company of Mr. Rochell 
21 at this point in time for in excess of 15 to 20 to 25 minutes 
22 by the time they get up to the car jthe second time. And he 
23 candidly has indicated to you that there has been absolutely 
24 nothing about Mr. Rochell £hat alerted him to any weapons. 
25 He was not angry. He was cooperative. He did not make any 
<Y.ff>. <n JU*A— s*_...a n _ i 
inadvertent gestures, nothing which would lead him to believe 
that he was armed or dangerous. 
I think it's also very crucial and very candidly 
stated by the trooper that he had formed the intent to search 
his person when he walked up to the car the second time. He 
hadn't seen any bulges in the pocket. He hadn't asked him to 
step out. He had absolutely no reason at that time to 
suspect that either party was armed or dangerous. And he 
forms the intent that he will search their person prior to 
searching the contents of the vehicle. 
Now, it would appear to me that the longer you're 
with someone on a traffic stop, the greater feel you have for 
the type of stop that you have. Is it a dangerous one, or 
are the parties cooperating and so forth? And I would 
suspect that based on all of the evidence before the Court, 
there is nothing out of the ordinary, nothing unusual. The 
only unusual factor being the open container that fell out. 
But there was nothing to alert the officer that these people 
had any weapons on them. In fact, as the case turns out, 
there were no weapons. The officer forms the intent to 
search not based on any facts that he can specifically 
articulate to the Court. 
And I submit that under the Terry v. Ohio and under 
Section 77-6-16 that he had no right to search the person. 
If he felt endangered, if he felt that they had a weapon or 
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if they were being uncooperative, if they were mad at him, if 
they were angry, those might be facts that he could tell the 
Court. But that's not the case. These people have done 
absolutely nothing to alert him to the fact that he might be 
in danger* 
Secondly, your Honor, I believe that the trooper 
exceeded the scope and the duration of his initial stop when 
he orders both of the parties out of the vehicle so that he 
can search the vehicle and he can search their person. I did 
not cite this particular case, but after getting counsel's 
memorandum, and I will give the Court a copy of it and 
counsel a copy of it. There's State of Utah vs. Hargraves, 
February 7th, 1991, case that the Court of Appeals decided, 
and that basically is a traffic stop. And the Court stated: 
"If the trial court finds that the defendant 
Hargraves was in custody throughout this incident91 — 
and there's no question the trooper's indicated these 
parties were in his custody, they were not free to 
leave — "the Court must determine whether the custody 
was lawful in its scope and duration." 
And you read the cases under Terry V. Ohio and the 
following cases. 
"The detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to affectuate the purpose of the 
stop." 
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1 And I submit that he had concluded and had done 
2 everything that he had to when he filled out that citation 
3 I and walked up there and was prepared to hand the citation to 
4 I the parties. And I submit that he has exceeded the duration 
5 and the scope of his initial stop when he orders them out of 
6 I the vehicle to step forward so he can search them and search 
7 the vehicle. 
8 I Thirdly, I would submit that he had no probable 
9 I cause to search the vehicle. It would be erroneous to saying 
10 that any time you detect the odor of alcohol about someone's 
11 person, you can search their vehicle. If you follow the 
12 trooper's reasoning, he had two people with the odor of 
13 alcohol about their breath, about their person. He observes 
14 one open container. He does not see any objects when he's 
15 passing by or observing the inside of that vehicle to alert 
16 him to any other open container. And*I submit that he does 
17 not have probable cause to search the vehicle simply because 
18 the driver has the odor of alcohol about his person. 
19 And the only other point that I would like to make, 
20 I your Honor, is there was a fairly recent case, just decided 
21 last month — well, actually it looks like the end of 
22 I January, January 30th, 1992. It's State vs. Godina-Luna, 
23 I also a traffic stop. And in that case, the Court of Appeals 
24 emphasized again that: 
25 "The length and scope of the detention must be 
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1 j strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances 
2 which rendered its initiation" — the initial stop — 
3 "permissible. Once the reasons for the initial stop 
4 have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed to 
5 I proceed on his or or her way* Any further temporary 
6 I detention for investigative questioning after the 
7 fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
6 is justified under the fourth amendment only if the 
9 detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious 
10 J criminal activity." 
11 I submit the trooper did not. And I will give the 
12 Court and counsel a copy of both of those cases which I did 
13 I not attach to the memorandum in as much as counsel's 
14 I memorandum alerted me to those issues. 
15 I I would submit it, your Honor. I would ask that 
16 the baggy of cocaine found on his person be suppressed and 
17 that the baggy of cocaine found in the passenger seat 
18 I likewise be suppressed inasmuch as the second baggy obviously 
19 came from exploitation of what I believe to be an illegal 
20 I search and seizure which led to its finding after the 
21 Wrongful taking of the first one. Thank you. 
22 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
23 I Any rebuttal? 
24 I MR. McGUIRE: Just one matter, your Honor. 
25 I With regard to the Hargraves and Godina-Luna 
Alut. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL. DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921700013 
This matter came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on the 18th day of March, 1992. Defendant was present and 
represented by Robert Neeley, the State was represented by William 
K. McGuire. The Court, having heard evidence and considered the 
memoranda of the parties, hereby enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Defendant was stopped for speeding 65 miles per hour 
in a 55 mile per hour zone. 
2. Officer David Maycock noticed smell of alcohol on 
defendant's breath. 
3. Upon securing the registration, an open container 
fell from the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer 
determined it contained alcohol. 
4. The passenger in the vehicle had also been consuming 
an alcoholic beverage. 
5. The officer proceeded to write out citations; 
speeding and no seat belt to defendant and open container to the 
passenger. He then determined to search the vehicle for additional 
open containers since both occupants had been drinking, but only 
one container had been seen at that time. 
6. The officer askesd each occupant whether they had any 
weapons. The passengerf Mr. Miller, said no, csmptied his pockets 
and turned around to show that he had no weapons. The defendant 
was hesitant in answering no and did not offer the contents of his 
pocket. 
7. The officer noticed a bulge in defendant's left front 
pocket measuring 3-1/2 inches in diameter and 1 to 1-1/2 inches 
deep. The officer believed it could have been a knife or other 
weapon. 
8. After the officer asked what the bulge was, defendant 
reached into his pocket and pulled out keys. However, the bulge 
was still present and the officer found it was still hard. The 
defendant then reached in and pulled out coins and as he did so a 
portion of a plastic baggie was exposed. 
9. The officer asked what it was and the defendant said 
"nothing" and pulled his hand out of the pocket and placed it 
behind his back. 
10. A second officer, approaching from the rear, 
observed a baggie of white powder and seized it. 
11. Following the seizure of the baggie, defendant told 
the officer that another baggie was in the car and it was seized. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper 
traffic stop and not a pretext stop. 
2. The officer had probable cause to believe that 
another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle and therefore a 
search of the vehicle for that purpose was appropriate. 
3. It was reasonable for the officer to determine if 
either of the occupants were armed with weapons prior to commencing 
a search of the vehicle. Based upon what he observed, the officer 
had a right to conduct a pat down of both occupants. 
4. The seizure of the plastic baggie from defendant's 
hand was permissible. 
5. The seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was 
pursuant to a valid arrest and appropriate impound of the vehicle. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant's motion 
to suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this /^ day of
 LZ^^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct unexecuted 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with 
postage prepaid thereon, to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant 
at 2495 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 3rd day 
of June, 1992. 
:retary/ Secf  
